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On December 3, 1999, Treasury took an important
step toward conforming a portion of the federal estate
tax system to the economic realities of estate administration. It issued final regulations 1 that deal sensibly
with the effect of certain administration expenses on
the amount of the estate tax marital and charitable
deductions. The regulations were issued in response to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hubert.2 This article
examines the new regulations against the backdrop of
the Court’s decision.

I. The Issue in Hubert and Its Resolution
In Hubert, the Supreme Court considered the impact
of estate administration expenses on the marital and
charitable deductions. The issue was whether the
amount of the deduction allowed for a marital or
charitable gift that bears the burden of administration
e xp e n se s s h o ul d b e re du ce d to refle ct t hi s encumbrance. The executors of Hubert’s estate and the
Internal Revenue Service had agreed that those administration expen ses that burdened the marital or
charitable bequests under Hubert’s will and that were
chargeable to principal under state law would reduce
the amount of the deductions. The question before the
Court was whether a reduction was required for such
an administration expense if, under the testamentary
instrument, state law, or as a result of a discretionary
act by the executor, the expense was charged to accounting income.3
Although the Hubert decision was splintered among
four separate opinions, all of the Justices based their

1
T.D. 8846, 64 Fed. Reg. 67763, corrected, in part by Announcement 2000-3, 2000-2 IRB 296, Doc 2000-1976 (1 original
page), 2000 TNT 11-11.
2
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, Doc 97-7754
(51 pages), 97 TNT 53-13 (1997).
3
Accounting income is the category of receipts that are
distributable to the person who is entitled or eligible to
receive trust accounting income from a trust. Although trust
accounting income is primarily a local law concept, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended uses the concept
for several purposes. For example, a trust qualifying for the
marital deduction under section 2056(b)(5) or 2056(b)(7) must
be required to distribute all of its accounting income to the
surviving spouse. Throughout this article, the terms “accounting income” and income are used interchangeably.
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analysis principally on the last two sentences in Treas.
reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a). The dispute was resolved,
in large part, by a construction of these two sentences,
which at the time provided:
In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse, account must be taken
of the effect of any material limitations upon her 4
right to income from the property. An example of
a case in which this rule may be applied is a
bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the
decedent’s spouse but the income from the
property from the date of decedent’s death until
distribution of the property to the trustee is to be
used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate.

The two opinions left the
material-limitation concept intact as a
weapon available to the Service in
future cases.
The plurality opinion (by four Justices) concluded
that the application of the estate’s accounting income
to the payment of administration expenses would reduce the deduction only if the use of such income to
pay for administration expenses could be viewed as
creating a material limitation on the spouse’s right to
receive income from the marital share. A concurring
opinion (by three Justices) similarly concluded — although through somewhat different reasoning — that
it was appropriate to reduce the deduction on account
of such expenses if the material-limitation concept was
violated. Although the plurality and concurring
opinions did not reach agreement as to the contours of
the material-limitation concept, both opinions concluded that, based on the record, the executor’s use of
estate income to pay for administration expenses did
not create a material limitation on the spouse’s right to
receive income. As a result, the Hubert estate’s marital
deduction was not reduced on account of the administration expenses. But the two opinions left the
material-limitation concept intact as a weapon available to the Service in future cases.

II. The Consequences of Hubert
Hu bert created the potential for the economic
equivalent of a double deduction, consisting of: (i) an
inflated estate tax marital deduction (i.e., inflated in
the sense that the deduction is not reduced even though
administration expenses are paid from the marital
share) and (ii) either a second estate tax deduction or
an income tax deduction for these same administration
expenses. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer dies
with a gross estate of $2 million. Her will gives an
amount equal to the maximum amount that can pass
free of federal estate tax, after taking into account her

4

Throughout the regulations, the surviving spouse is
referred to as female.
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remaining applicable exclusion amount of $600,000, to
a trust for the benefit of her children. It gives the
balance to a trust that qualifies for the marital deduction, from which the trust income must be paid each
year to her husband. Her estate incurs administration
expenses of $100,000, which the will requires be paid
from the income otherwise allocable to the marital
deduction bequest. With an estate tax exemption
equivalent of $600,000 and the administration expenses
deducted for estate tax purposes under section 2053,
the marital deduction would be $1,300,000, leaving
$700,000 for the children’s trust. The administration
expense deduction of $100,000, although paid from the
income earned on the husband’s share, would reduce
the taxable estate to $600,000, leaving a tax liability of
zero.
Because the marital deduction is designed to permit
a deferral of the estate tax obligation until the surviving
spouse dies rather than an exclusion, the amount of the
deduction in the estate of the first spouse to die should
be limited to the amount flowing into the surviving
spouse’s estate for later inclusion in his or her federal
gross estate. In other words, for the marital deduction
to carry out its purpose, the amount of the marital
bequest, as well as any income generated by it, must
form a part of the surviving spouse’s estate. In this
example, a marital deduction of $1,300,000 should be
available only if that amount, together with all of the
income it generates from the date of the decedent
spouse’s death, becomes part of the surviving spouse’s
estate. But, under Hubert, even though the administration expenses of $100,000 in effect reduces the
amount available for inclusion in the surviving
spouse’s estate, the estate is permitted a marital deduction of $1,300,000, as long as no violation of the
material-limitation concept occurs. In this example, the
estate enjoys a marital deduction that is inflated by
$100,000 and, as a result, the children’s trust receives
$100,000 more than that amount normally protected by
the applicable credit amount. 5
If, in this example, the estate had taken the administration expense as an income tax deduction instead,
Hubert still permits an inflated marital deduction (assuming again the material-limitation concept were not
violated). With the $100,000 expense deducted on the
estate’s income tax return, the marital deduction would
be $1,400,000 (even though the bequest bears the economic burden of the administration expense). The taxable estate would again be $600,000, producing a tax
of zero. In this case, the children’s trust is not benefited
by the inflated marital deduction. Instead, the administration expenses produce a $100,000 income tax
deduction and a marital deduction that is inflated by
$100,000.

5
See Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Madeline J. Rivlin, “Drafting for Estate Administration Expenses After Hubert,” 136
Trust & Estates No. 9, 57 (August 1997) at 64-65 (This article
anticipated new regulations. Id. at 60.); Joseph M. Dodge,
“Lifting the Shroud Obscuring Estate of Hubert: The Logic of
the Income and Estate Tax Treatment of Estate Administration
Expenses,” 3 Fla. Tax Rev. 647 (1998).
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The code contains three different rules that bear on
the double-deduction issue. First, section 642(g) provides that administration expenses may be deducted
either on the estate’s income tax return (under section
212) or on its estate tax return (under section 2053), but
not on both returns. Second, section 2056(b)(9) provides that no deduction for the same amount may be
taken twice for estate tax purposes. Third, section
2056(b)(4)(B) requires that any expense or obligation
burdening a marital bequest must be taken into account
in the same manner as if it were an inter vivos gift. The
Supreme Court had previously held that the third rule
limits the marital deduction to the net economic
amount received by the spouse.6
In Hubert, t h e admi ni st rat ion exp en se s w ere
deducted on the estate’s income tax returns; the estate
did not seek to deduct these expenses for federal estate
tax purposes. All of the Justices were, therefore, able
to agree that the prohibition contained in section 642(g)
was not directly applicable, though the dissenting Justices found the section somewhat relevant.7 And not
having sought a double estate tax deduction, the estate
obviously did not violate the prohibition contained in
section 2056(b)(9). Consequently, none of the Justices
found it necessary to discuss this section. That left the
Court (the plurality, the concurrence, and the dissenting opinions) to focus its analysis largely on section
2056(b)(4)(B) and its implementing regulation, Treas.
reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a).
Although the four-Justice plurality did not express
any discomfort with the double deduction its decision
would permit, the other opinions did reveal a concern
about this issue. Indeed, the concurrence explicitly
acknowledged that the statute could accommodate
new regulations precluding taxpayers from enjoying
double deductions.8 Moreover, in the view of the dis-

6

See United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
520 U.S. at 137. See also Mitchell M. Gans, “Will Administration Expenses Charged to Income Reduce the Marital
Deduction?” 71 J. Tax’n 90 (1989) (arguing that if a double
deduction is permitted with respect to administration expenses, the spirit, if not the letter, of section 642(g) would be
violated), cited by Tax Court Judge Beghe in his concurring
in part and dissenting in part opinion in Hubert, 101 T.C. 314,
349, Doc 93-10865 (57 pages), 93 TNT 215-7 (1993)).
8
520 U.S. at 122. Tax practitioners have long been accustomed to the notion that regulations are entitled to deference
when issued contemporaneously with the enactment of the
underlying statute. See, e.g., Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741,
750 (1969). From this perspective, one might anticipate that
any regulations currently issued under the marital deduction
section, which was enacted in 1948, would be entitled to little
or no deference on any challenge to their validity. This mode
of analysis with respect to regulations has, however, fallen
into disfavor. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), the relationship between the agencies and the
courts has been substantially reworked. In Smiley v. Citibank,
517 U.S. 735 (1996), for example, the Court applied Chevron’s
deferential standard of review in upholding a regulation issued more than 100 years after the enactment of the under7

(Footnote 8 continued in next column.)
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senters, the existing regulation could be construed as
prohibiting double deductions.
What made the estate’s argument in Hubert tenable,
and ultimately successful, was the regulation’s emphasis on state law. The underlying statute (section
2056(b)(4)) provides that obligations encumbering the
marital gift must be taken into account, with the statute
making no distinction between obligations chargeable
to income and obligations chargeable to principal
under state law. The statute can easily be read — indeed, is perhaps better read — as requiring a reduced
deduction whenever the marital gift is made subject to
an obligation or expense. Under the regulation, however, special treatment was provided for administration expenses charged to accounting income, triggering a reduced deduction only when the expense
effected a material limitation on the right to that income.
This special treatment for expenses charged to income under state law is economically unjustifiable. The
marital deduction will effectuate its deferral objective
only if the deduction is not permitted to exceed the
amount available for inclusion in the surviving
spouse’s estate. If the amount passing to the spouse is
encumbered by an obligation, the encumbrance will
have the effect of reducing the amount in the surviving
spouse’s estate, regardless of its characterization as an
income or principal charge under state law. If the marital deduction is not to be inflated, any expense burdening the marital gift must reduce the amount of the
deduction, unless, as discussed below, the expense is
related to the investment or preservation of the marital
gift rather than to its transmission.
Moreover, as is often the case when the tax law puts
an overemphasis on state law, gaming opportunities
are created.9 In this case, the state law emphasis creates
the opportunity to enjoy double deductions. In the
aftermath of Hubert, many lawyers began drafting testamentary instruments to require that administration
expenses be charged to the spouse’s income interest,
subject to the proviso that the charge not be made to

lying statute and in response to litigation. Thus, the invitation to amend the regulations offered by the three Justices in
the concurrence must be understood in light of the changing
environment created under Chevron. Significantly, this alteration in the relationship between the courts and the agencies
has not been lost on the Service. Recently, for example, perceiving a conflict between the Second and Eighth Circuits on
a generation-skipping tax issue (compare Simpson v. United
States, 183 F.3d 812, Doc 1999-25088 (8 original pages), 1999
TNT 142-69 (8th Cir. 1999) with Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795, Doc 96-7270 (16 pages), 96 TNT 49-9
(2nd Cir. 1996)), Treasury proposed regulations adopting the
position it had advanced in the courts. See prop. reg. section
26.2601-1 (November 18, 1999). Under pre-Chevron practice,
the Service presumably would have sought to resolve the
conflict in the courts. Apparently, it now believes it is able to
resolve the conflict simply by declaring victory in new regulations.
9
See Mitchell M. Gans, “Federal Transfer Taxation and the
Role of State Law: Does the Marital Deduction Strike the
Proper Balance?” 48 Emory L.J. 871 (1999).
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the marital share to the extent it would create a material
limitation on the spouse’s right to income.10

III. The New Regulations
The new regulations contain a few simple rules.
They first divide all administration expenses into two
categories, estate management expenses and estate
transmission expenses. (Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)4(d)(1)(i) and (ii).) They then provide that the marital
deduction is to be reduced by: (1) the amount of estate
transmission expenses paid from the marital share,
whether from income or principal; (2) the amount of
any estate management expenses paid from the marital
share to the extent not attributable to the marital share;
and (3) the amount of any estate management expenses
attributable to the marital share that are deducted
under section 2053. (Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(2)
- (4).)
The third required reduction is necessary to prevent
the use of a section 2053 deduction for management
expenses paid from a marital bequest to protect bequests to others from estate tax. Consider the following
example:
D dies with a gross estate worth $2 million,
$90,000 of which is a death benefit payable to D’s
daughter under a life insurance policy on D’s life
owned by D at the time of her death. As a result
of gifts made during her lifetime, D’s estate will
be subject to estate tax at a rate of 55 percent. The
state estate tax equals the state tax credit available
under section 2011. D’s will gives her entire estate
to her husband outright. State law requires the
daughter to pay the estate taxes attributable to
the inclusion of the life insurance proceeds in D’s
g ross e st at e. Es ta te m an ag e me nt e xpe n ses
amount to $90,000. D’s executor deducts the
$90,000 as an administration expense on D’s
federal estate tax return. Total estate tax deductions, in the absence of the third required reduction described above, would have been $2 million
($1,910,000 marital and $90,000 administrative).
As a result, in the absence of the third required
reduction, no estate tax would have been imposed on the life insurance proceeds passing to
the daughter.11
The new regulations eliminate the opportunity to
create double estate tax deductions. They abandon the
material-limitation concept by deleting from Treas. reg.
section 20.2056(b)-4(a) the two critical sentences that

10
See, e.g., Blattmachr and Rivlin, supra note 5; Stephen P.
Lappert, David C. Jacobson and Adriane K. McIntyre, “How to
Allocate Estate Expenses Under Hubert,” New York Law Journal,
Apr. 4, 1998. As indicated, because this allocation of expenses
to income or principal may be controlled by the terms of the
governing instrument, reliance on state law to effect the tax
benefit is not even necessary — just clever or efficient drafting.
11
There would have been a similar impact even in a nontaxable estate because a formula nonmarital bequest could
have been increased by an amount equal to the section 2053
management expenses paid by the marital share.
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had been the focus of the Court’s attention in Hubert,
and they make irrelevant the income or principal characterization of expenses supplied by state law or the
testamentary instrument.
The fact that management expenses attributable to
and charged against a marital bequest will not reduce
the marital deduction permits the estate to take an
income tax deduction for the expense without increasing the taxable estate. The failure to reduce the marital
deduction by the amount of such expenses does not
give the estate a double deduction. Because management expenses are the same kind of expenses the
spouse or his or her trust would have paid for the
management of the property if it had been distributed
immediately rather than kept in the estate during the
period of administration, it would be inappropriate to
use these expenses to reduce the marital deduction.
This point is illustrated by the following example:
Decedent spouse bequeaths property with a value of
$1 million to surviving spouse and $25,000 in cash to
enable surviving spouse to pay for the cost of managing the bequeathed property. The decedent’s estate
would be entitled to a marital deduction of $1,025,000,
and the surviving spouse would be entitled to an income tax deduction (under section 212) of $25,000. No
one would seriously maintain that this constitutes an
impermissible double deduction: Whenever a transfer
is made to a surviving spouse, a marital deduction is
permitted; an d w hen the surviving spouse subsequently expends the amount transferred on a taxdeductible item, the surviving spouse becomes entitled
to an income tax deduction.
The new regulations are consistent with this example. They permit (i) the marital deduction and (ii)
an income tax deduction to the estate in lieu of the
income tax deduction the surviving spouse would ordinarily enjoy for a management expense. 12 The new
regulations do not permit the same treatment for transmission expenses because, unlike management expenses, they are not incurred by or on behalf of the
surviving spouse. Instead, they are incurred in the
process of transferring wealth to the surviving spouse.

A. Illustrations and Drafting
To illustrate the treatment of transmission expenses
under the new regulations, assume a gross estate of
$2,075,000, estate transmission expenses of $100,000,
which the governing instrument charges to the marital
deduction bequest, and a typical tax-minimization
marital formula clause. With an estate tax-exemption
equivalent of $675,000 and assuming the expenses are
taken as an estate tax deduction (under section 2053),

12
A deduction on the estate’s income tax return, however,
may not be the complete equivalent of an income tax deduction on the surviving spouse’s personal income tax return. A
personal income tax deduction for management expenses
would presumably constitute a miscellaneous itemized
deduction (see section 67), while a deduction on the estate’s
income tax return would probably not be so viewed. See O’Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302, Doc 93-6321, 93 TNT 118-14
(6th Cir. 1993).
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a marital deduction of $1,300,000 (together with the
$100,000 administration expense deduction) would
bring the taxable estate to $675,000 and reduce the
federal estate tax to zero. Under the new regulations,
transmission expenses burdening a marital gift reduce
the amount of the marital deduction, a formula clause
would produce a marital gift of $1,400,000 (converting
into a marital deduction of $1,300,000 by virtue of the
reduction the regulations require). On the other hand,
if the expenses were deducted on the estate’s income
tax return, a marital deduction of $1,400,000 would be
necessary to reduce the tax to zero. Thus, in that case,
a formula clause would produce a marital gift of
$1,500,000, converting into the requisite marital deduction of $1,400,000 once the reduction mandated by the
regulations is taken into account. The estate in this
example would have the following options: (1) enjoy
an immediate tax savings from taking the $100,000 income tax deduction, at the cost of increasing the surviving spouse’s estate by $100,000 (together with any
income or appreciation the $100,000 sum generates
over surviving spouse’s life), or (2) forego the income
tax savings and secure, instead, the benefit of excluding
the $100,000 sum (with income or appreciation on that
amount) from the surviving spouse’s estate.
The same results would be achieved if the governing
instrument charged the nonmarital bequest with the
burden of the transmission expenses. To illustrate, if
the expenses were charged to the nonmarital share and
taken as an estate tax deduction, the formula would
produce a marital deduction of $1,300,000. And because the expenses do not burden the marital gift, a
marital gift of $1,300,000 would produce the requisite
marital deduction of $1,300,000. As in the case when
the expenses burden the marital gift, the amount flowing into the surviving spouse’s estate is $1,300,000. On
the other hand, assuming the expenses were taken as
an income tax deduction, the amount flowing into the
surviving spouse’s estate would remain at $1,400,000
even if the marital gift were not burdened by the expense: With the deduction taken on the income tax
return, the formula would call for a marital deduction
of $1,400,000, which would be satisfied by a nonburdened marital gift of $1,400,000.
Whether estate transmission expenses are charged
to the marital deduction bequest or the non-marital
deduction bequest will not be significant, if the maritalformula clause self-adjusts (i.e., as long as the formula,
after taking into account whether or not the marital gift
is to bear the expense, will produce the optimal, or
“reduce to zero,” marital deduction).13 If, however, the
marital-formula clause does not self-adjust, the marital
13
See Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(d)(5), Example 5 (where
the formula clause self-adjusts to provide the appropriate
marital deduction depending on whether the transmission
expenses are taken as income or estate tax deductions). Although, based on Example 5, it would appear that the typical
formula clause will self-adjust and that there is, therefore, no
need for any drafting modification, it may be prudent to include language such as the following in the clause: taking into
account management expenses, transmission expenses, and
the manner in which these expenses are taken as deductions.
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deduction could be underutilized if transmission expenses are borne by the marital deduction gift. For
example, if the testamentary instrument specifies an
amount for the marital deduction bequest of, say,
$1,400,000 and charges the transmission expenses to
t ha t g ift, t he m arita l dedu ction wou ld be only
$1,300,000 and an estate tax liability would result unless the transmission expenses are deducted as administration expenses under section 2053.14
The regulations do not require a reduction in the
marital deduction on account of an executor’s power
to reduce the marital share by the amount of estate
transmission expenses. The estate transmission expenses must actually be paid from the marital share to
cause a reduction in the marital deduction. Although
this may be contrary to conventional marital-deduction
thinking,15 it is not contrary to Hubert. In Hubert, the
estate and the Service had agreed that expenses
charged to principal would reduce the amount of the
marital deduction. The Service did not take the position
that the deduction should be reduced on account of the
discretion given to the executor to charge the expenses
to principal. The absence of a penalty for broad discretion is also consistent with cases such as Estate of
Clayton v. Commissioner,16 in which the Fifth Circuit
permitted a marital deduction for property that would
not have passed to the surviving spouse if the executor
had not made a qualified terminable interest property
(“QTIP”) election.17
In the case of estate management expenses, care must
be taken in drafting formula clauses to ensure that

14
For an article on drafting under the new regulations (written when the regulations were in proposed form), see Eileen
Caulfield Schwab and Darcy M. Katris, “Administration Expense Regulations Proposed,” New York Law Journal, Apr. 5,
1999.
15
See, e.g., Wycoff v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 506
F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that where the executor is
given the discretion to apportion the burden of estate taxes
to the marital share, section 2056(b)(4) requires that the
deduction be reduced even if the executor chooses to apportion the tax to the nonmarital share). But see the Tax Court
decision in Hubert (101 T.C. 314 (1993) (indicating that the
rule established in Wycoff deals with the executor’s discretion
to apportion taxes between the marital and nonmarital share,
not with an executor’s discretion to allocate expenses between income and principal); Patterson v. U.S., 181 F.3d 927,
930 at n.2 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that the Tax Court in
Hubert limited the Wycoff principle in this fashion). On the
other hand, it has been suggested that Wycoff has been implicitly overruled in its entirety by the Supreme Court
decision in Hubert. See Richard B. Covey, Practical Drafting,
July 1997 at 4885.
16
Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
1992), rev’g 97 T.C. 327 (1991).
17
See also Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 779,
Doc 94-1612, 94 TNT 26-16 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’g 98 T.C. 678
(1992); Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir.
1995), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1992-579; and Estate of Clack v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 131, Doc 96-6201 (71 pages), 96 TNT 43-9
(1996). In 1998, Treasury changed the regulations to conform
to these decisions. T.D. 8779, amending Treas. reg. section
20.2056(b)-7(d)(3).
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management expenses attributable to the marital share
are charged against that share. In addition, the formula
defining the marital and nonmarital shares may have
to be redrafted. To illustrate, assume a gross estate of
$2 million, an estate tax-exemption equivalent of
$6 00,0 00, $10 0,00 0 of m ana gem ent expe nses attributable to the residuary estate that were taken as
income tax deductions, and a will that gives everything
to the decedent’s husband other than the amount calculated by the following formula clause:
Bequest of the Applicable Credit Amount. If my
husband survives me, I give to my daughter an
amount equal to the “applicable credit amount.”
The “applicable credit amount” is the largest
amount, if any, that can pass free of federal estate
tax (determined without regard to any renunciation or disclaimer that my husband may make)
based on the credit allowable against such tax
under section 2010 of the code, and no other
credits, reduced by: (1) the value of all property
includible in my gross estate that passes under
any other Article or passes or has passed outside
of this Will and that does not qualify for the marital or charitable deduction or any other deduction
permitted under the federal estate tax law in effect at my death, (2) the amount of my adjusted
taxable gifts, and (3) the expenses and debts of my
estate that are chargeable to principal and that are not
allowed as federal estate tax deductions in my estate.
The formula reduces the amount of the applicable
credit bequest by the amount of the management expenses. As a result, the residue passing to the husband
will be $1,400,000. The daughter will receive only
$500,000. The remaining $100,000 will be used to pay
the management expenses.
This formula, which was typical of the formulas
used before the issuance of the final Hubert regulations,
w ill overutiliz e t he marit al deduction and will
diminish the amount passing to the daughter. Given
the new regulations, the formula should be changed to
prevent this overutilization from occurring. The following is an example:
Bequest of the Applicable Credit Amount. If my
husband survives me, I give to my daughter an
amount equal to the “applicable credit amount.”
The “applicable credit amount” is the largest
amount, if any, that can pass free of federal estate
tax (determined without regard to any renunciation or disclaimer that my husband may make)
based on the credit allowable against such tax
under section 2010 of the code, and no other
credits, reduced by: (1) the value of all property
includible in my gross estate that passes under
any other Article or passes or has passed outside
of this Will and that does not qualify for the marital or charitable deduction or any other deduction
permitted under the federal estate tax law in effect at my death, (2) the amount of my adjusted
taxable gifts, and (3) the expenses and debts of my
estate (other than estate management expenses attributable to property passing under this will to my
husband) that are not allowed as federal estate tax
974

deductions in my estate. For purposes of this provision, the term “estate management expenses” shall
have the meaning given to it in Treas. reg. section
20.2056(b)-(4)(d)(1)(i).
Under this formula, the husband’s residuary bequest
would be $1,300,000, and the daughter would receive
$600,000. The daughter would receive an additional
$100,000 without incurring any estate tax.
A word of caution is in order about double deductions. Because the regulations do not permit a double
estate tax deduction (i.e., an inflated marital deduction
and an estate tax deduction under section 2053),18 it
will never be appropriate to take management expenses attributable to a bequest eligible for the marital
deduction as an estate tax deduction under section
2053. Taking such a deduction would reduce the marital deduction by an equal amount. As a result, there
will be no estate tax benefit derived from the deduction. In virtually all cases, it will be preferable to take
an income tax deduction for such expenses.
One further comment is in order about drafting.
Under Hubert, charging an expense to income could, in
some cases, produce a double deduction. The final
Hubert regulations, as indicated, have completely abandoned the income/principal distinction. As a consequence, it will no longer be necessary for the testamentary instrument to charge expenses to income or for the
testamentary instrument to give the executor the discretion to do so.

B. Definition of Mgmt. and Transmission Expenses
The regulations define management expenses as
those incurred in connection with investment, manageme nt, or pre servation of e state assets durin g a
reasonable period of administration. The regulations
give the following examples of possible management
expenses: investment advisory fees, stock brokerage
commissions, custodial fees, and interest.19 Transmission expenses are defined to include any administration expense that is not a management expense. The
regulations go on to give further guidance, indicating
that expenses incurred in collecting the decedent’s assets, paying debts and taxes, and making distribution
to the beneficiaries are all transmission expenses. They
give the following as possible examples of transmission expenses: executor ’s fees, attorney’s fees, appraisal fees, and expenses incurred in defending a

18
See Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(d)(3) (providing that
the marital deduction must be reduced by the amount of a
management expense if it is taken as a section 2053 estate tax
deduction).
19
As a general matter, interest, though viewed as a
management expense, will not generate a double deduction.
Under section 163(h), interest cannot be deducted on the
estate’s income tax return (unless the interest is incurred in
connection with an extension of time to pay the estate tax).
And if the interest is instead deducted on the estate tax return
(section 2053), this will result in a reduced marital deduction,
thus precluding the estate from enjoying a double deduction.
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probate contest or in a construction proceeding. In the
case of executors’ and attorneys’ fees, however, the
regulations do make an exception. When it can be
shown that these expenses are specifically related to
management functions (i.e., investment, management,
or preservation of estate assets), they are treated as a
management expense.

The regulations leave several
unanswered questions.
The regulations do not indicate how such a showing
can be made, and leave several unanswered questions:
Will it be possible for an executor to use time records
to establish what portion of his, her, or its compensation is attributable to management functions? Will the
apportionment depend on whether, under state law,
part of the executor’s fee is chargeable to income or is
determined based on the amount of income collected
during administration? The answer to this question
should be in the negative in view of the regulations’
rejection of the income-principal distinction. Will the
states adopt legislation apportioning the executor ’s fee
between management and transmission functions? If,
for example, a state were to enact legislation providing
that 90 percent of the executor ’s fee represents compensation for management functions and 10 percent
represents compensation for transmission functions,
would the Service argue that 90 percent of the compensation is not specifically related to management functions? And what about the compensation paid to a
trustee under a trust that was revocable during the
decedent’s lifetime and that is used as a testamentary
substitute? Since transmission activities are generally
reduced by the use of a revocable trust, arguably a
major portion of the trustees’ commissions should be
treated as management expenses.
To minimize the impact of this uncertainty, the will
or revocable trust could define management and transmission expenses by referencing the definition contained in the regulations (as illustrated by the formula
clause set forth above). With this approach, the final
characterization of the expense in any dispute with the
Service will determine its treatment.

C. Must the Marital Share Participate in Income?
The question of whether the amount of the marital
deduction must be reduced if the marital share is not
entitled to share in the estate’s income and gains
earned during administration is closely related to the
issue considered by the Supreme Court in Hubert. What
is the effect on the marital deduction, for example,
when the surviving spouse is to receive a pecuniary
(fixed sum-of-money) bequest that does not entitle it
to receive interest or to participate in estate income or
gains? Although there is no unambiguous authority on
the issue, there has been concern in the estate planning
community that the marital deduction might be reduced if the surviving spouse were not given the right
to receive income or interest during the period of estate
administration.
TAX NOTES, May 15, 2000

There is cause for this concern. In Hubert, Justice
Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, suggests that the
amount of the marital deduction would be reduced to
take into account a direction in the will that income
generated by the marital share during estate administration be payable to a beneficiary other than the
spouse (citing Treas. reg. sections 20.2056(b)-4(a),
20.2056(b)-5(f)(9), and Estate of Friedberg v. C.I.R.20 ). Although, in Justice Breyer ’s hypothetical, the will placed
the marital gift in trust, the same question arises in the
context of an outright pecuniary marital gift. In fact,
the one case cited by Justice Breyer, Estate of Friedberg,
involved an outright pecuniary marital bequest. The
will authorized the executor to delay distribution to
the spouse for a period of as much as five years
(depending on how a specified contingency was resolved). The Service argued that a reduction in the
marital deduction was required because of the possible
delay in making distribution. Tax Court Judge Halpern
rejected the Service’s argument because the spouse was
entitled to receive interest equal to no less than marital
gift’s share of estate income, but agreed with the Service that a reduction in the amount of the marital
deduction would ordinarily be necessary if distribution of the marital gift could be delayed and if the
spouse were not permitted to receive interest or income. Judge Halpern’s reasoning was based on the last
two sentences in Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a),
which were critical to the analysis made in the various
Hubert opinions. Because the new regulations omit
these two sentences, it is uncertain whether the conclusion reached by Judge Halpern in Friedberg remains
viable.21
The new regulations contain an example that supports the conclusion that no reduction of the marital
deduction is required by the failure to give a marital
bequest interest or a share of the estate’s income or
gains during the period of estate administration. The
will described in the example (Treas. reg. section 202056(b)-4(d)(5) Example 7), contains a pre-residuary
pecuniary marital bequest of $3 million and gives the
residue to the decedent’s child. Even though the spouse
is not entitled to participate in estate income or gains
(i.e., the income and gains inure to the benefit of the
residuary legatee), the example concludes that the estate is entitled to a $3 million marital deduction. The
new regulations seem to have implicitly adopted the
position that it is unnecessary to reduce the amount of
the marital deduction simply because the spouse is
prevented from participating in estate income or gains.
If, in fact, this understanding of the example is correct,
estate planners should consider making the marital
bequest pecuniary without the right to participate in
income or gains during the estate-administration
period. Under such an approach, less will flow into the

20

63 TCM 3080 (1992).
In this regard, it should be noted that the Friedberg court,
in n.48, also cited Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(b) and indicated that this regulation, which has not been amended,
provided additional support for its conclusion.
21
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surviving spouse’s estate than if the spouse were permitted to participate in income (or to receive interest
on the bequest).
The example in this regulation, however, does not
indicate whether a reduction in the marital deduction
would be necessary if the will explicitly called for a
postponed distribution to the spouse (or if the will
called for a postponement but only during a reasonable
period of administration). The implication, may be that
as long as the governing instrument does not provide
for an explicit postponement, no reduction is necessary
(it remaining unclear whether a reduction would be
necessary if the testamentary instrument called for a
postponement but only during a reasonable period of
administration). Perhaps the underlying premise of the
regulation is that, if the testamentary instrument does
not mandate a postponement, state law will prevent
the executor from unduly delaying the distribution.
In the absence of a provision in the will authorizing
a delay in distribution to the spouse, state law would
likely give the spouse a claim against the executor
should he or she fail to make prompt distribution. This
claim would become part of the spouse’s estate (or
would trigger a taxable gift if the claim were not asserted), just as a right to participate in estate income
and gains would produce an inclusion in the spouse’s
estate.22 This kind of tacit reliance on state law could
prove, however, as it often does, to be problematic.23
Consider, for example, the possible enactment of state
legislation denying the beneficiary of a pecuniary bequest any claim against the fiduciary (or any claim to
interest or to participate in estate income or gains)
unless the testamentary instrument affirmatively required distribution within a specified time — or perhaps legislation setting a nominal interest rate to comp e n sa t e fo r an y de la y un le ss t h e te st am en ta ry
instrument established a higher rate. To the extent such
legislation is enacted, or to the extent statutes presently

22

See Estate of de St. Aubin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 409, Doc 98-27999 (54 pages), 98 TNT
178-11 (1998) (holding, among other things, that the widow’s
so-called “minimum worth” hybrid pecuniary marital deduction bequest was not entitled to share in appreciation in her
husband’s estate under local, (New York) law even though
more than 15 years passed after the husband’s death before
the marital deduction bequest was funded and the value of
his estate increased by a factor of 10 during that time); compare
Matter of Abrams, 242 A.D.2d 450, 662 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1st Dept.
1997) (permitting the spouse to participate in appreciation in
the particular circumstances presented).
23
In section 2704, for example, the concept “applicable
restriction” is determined by reference to the default rule
under state law. As a consequence, various states have
enacted legislation changing the default rule to make their
partnership law friendlier to taxpayers concerned about running afoul of section 2704. The decision to allow state law to
govern in this fashion can be viewed as an inappropriate
overemphasis on state law. See Gans, note 8 supra.
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permit a delay in distribution without requiring compensation,24 the regulation’s premise fails to hold.
The fact that the regulations do not require that the
marital share participate in estate income or gains leads,
inevitably, to economically inconsistent treatment between a marital bequest that is entitled to share in income
and gains and one that is not. Assume, for example, that
the surviving spouse in Example 7 was entitled to the
income earned by the property that was distributed to
him in satisfaction of his pecuniary bequest, that such
income amounted to $300,000, and that $100,000 of the
income was used to pay estate transmission expenses.
The marital deduction, in this case, will be reduced by
$100,000, even though the surviving spouse will actually
receive a greater amount than the surviving spouse in
Example 7 (who received none of the income).
The flaw that leads to this anomalous result is not
a flaw in the Hubert regulations. The problem is that
the regulations do not reflect the economic reality that
a bequest of a fixed dollar amount to be satisfied at
some time in the future is worth less than the fixed
dollar amount. A similar issue arises whenever it is
necessary to calculate the amount of a bequest and the
payment of that bequest is deferred, thereby depriving
the legatee of the profits generated by the bequest
during the period of deferral. The issue is essentially
a “time value of money problem.” Treasury has resolved this issue in the context of the generation-skipping
transfer tax by requiring that unless “appropriate interest” is paid on a pecuniary bequest, it will not reduce
the amount of a residual transfer to which GST exemption is to be allocated on a dollar for dollar basis.25 It
should consider the same approach in connection with
the marital deduction.

D. The Charitable Deduction
Before the issuance of the new regulations, the impact of administration expenses on the charitable
deduction was less clear than their impact on the marital deduction. In fact, in Hubert, after beginning its
analysis with section 2056(b)(4) (indicating that obligations burdening the marital gift must be taken into account) and then focusing on the implementing regulation
(Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-4(a)), the plurality
acknowledged the absence of any counterpart in the
charitable deduction provision (section 2055) or in the
charitable deduction regulations. The plurality then alluded to the parties’ agreement that the impact on both
deductions should be determined in the same way and
chose the marital deduction as its framework for resolving both issues. The concurrence and dissent similarly
used the marital deduction as the controlling framework.
The regulations follow the approach taken by the
Court in Hubert, adopting the identical framework in
the charitable deduction regulations as they do for the
marital deduction. Therefore, as in the marital deduction
context, management expenses burdening a charitable
24

See Richard B. Covey, Marital Deduction and Credit Shelter
Dispositions and the Use of Formula Provisions (U.S. Trust Co.
1984), Appendix B for a list of state law rules on the payment
of interest or income on pecuniary and residuary dispositions.
25
See Treas. reg. sections 26.2642-2(b)(3) and 26.2654-1.
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gift do not reduce the amount of the charitable deduction, whereas transmission expenses so burdening a
charitable gift do result in a reduced deduction. See
Treas. reg. section 20.2055-3(b). The effect is to permit
the same income tax deduction for estate management
expenses that are attributable to and paid from
charitable gifts that marital gifts are permitted.
Rema inin g fait hful t o th e marita l deduction
framework, the regulations do not permit a double
deduction in the form of a double estate tax deduction
(i.e., an inflated charitable deduction and an estate tax
deduction under section 2053). See Treas. reg. section
20.2055-3(b)(3). Since the charitable deduction regulations on this issue are identical to the marital deduction
regulations, the considerations in terms of drafting are
the same: As in the case of a marital gift, the charitable
gift should be required to bear the burden of management expenses to secure an income tax deduction
without a reduction in the estate tax charitable deduction.26

The wholesale adoption of the marital
deduction framework for charitable
deduction purposes, while
superficially attractive, may not be
justified.
The wholesale adoption of the marital deduction
framework for charitable deduction purposes, while
superficially attractive, may not be justified, in terms
of either the code sections the regulations seek to implement or the underlying policy objectives. In terms
of the code, the marital deduction (section 2056) and
charitable deduction (section 2055) provisions are not
parallel. Two provisions in section 2056 critical to the
framework adopted in the regulations are missing from
section 2055: section 2056(b)(9),27 prohibiting a marital
deduction for an item otherwise deducted on the estate
tax return, and section 2056(b)(4), providing that
obligations encumbering a marital gift must be taken
into account. These two provisions obviously serve, in
the marital deduction context, as the statutory predicate for the rules prohibiting a double deduction for
transmission expenses and a double estate tax deduction for management expenses. Given the fact that section 2055 contains neither of these provisions, the
statutory basis for the double-deduction prohibitions
in the charitable deduction regulations is uncertain.
Indeed, Treas. reg. section 20.2055-3(b)(3), in requiring

26
Of course, if the entire estate passes to charity, the income
tax deduction will be of no value as a general rule. See Blattmachr and Rivlin, note 5 supra, at 62.
27
Although contained in the marital deduction section
(section 2056), the language, perhaps, is broad enough to
cover double estate tax deductions, regardless of whether one
is the marital deduction.
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a reduction in the amount of the charitable deduction
when the expense is deducted under section 2053, explicitly invokes section 2056(b)(9) as its statutory authority — not, most significantly, any provision in section 2055.
If the focus were strictly on the code, the conclusion
might well be reached — given the absence of any
double-deduction prohibition in section 2055 — that
double deductions should be permitted. In fact, in
Hubert, the Court permitted the estate a double deduction.28 At the same time, one might also conclude that
the code could be interpreted to preclude taxpayers
from enjoying double deductions. After all, the fourJustice concurrence was of the view that the code could
accommodate new regulations that would bar double
deductions entirely, not to mention the two dissenters
who would have barred double deductions based on
the regulations then existing. It is, however, difficult to
find any basis in the code for the compromise approach
actually adopted in the regulations.29
Finally, in some circumstances, it will not be appropriate to permit an estate to take an income tax
deduction for management expenses charged against
a charitable bequest without reducing the amount of
the charitable deduction. In the marital deduction context, the deduction seems appropriate since the spouse,
had he received an immediate distribution of his bequest and had he incurred the same management expense, would have been allowed to claim that deduction. In the charitable deduction context, the income
tax deduction will also be justified if the deduction
would have inured to the tax benefit of a noncharitable
beneficiary. If, however, the deduction would not have
inured to the tax benefit of a noncharitable beneficiary,
it seems inappropriate to permit the deduction.
Nonetheless, it is not likely that the validity of the
regulations could be successfully challenged given the
willingness of the Court in Hubert to analyze the
charitable deduction un der a marital deduction
framework; given the fact that the compromise is more
generous to taxpayers than the approach six Justices
thought either appropriate under existing regulations
or permissible under new regulations; and given the
increasing deference that regulations enjoy in the
courts.30

28
Cf. Hartwick College v. U.S., 611 F. Supp. 400 (N.D.N.Y
1985) (holding that the amount of the charitable deduction
under section 642(c) need not be reduced on account of the
burden of income tax liability imposed on the charitable gift).
29
Similarly, one might take the position that section 2056
could be construed as denying double deductions entirely or
as permitting them, but not as contemplating the compromise adopted in the regulations. As the concurrence indicates, however, the direction in section 2056(b)(4) that obligations encumbering the marital deduction gift be taken into
account is somewhat ambiguous: The section does not say
how they should be taken into account. See 520 U.S. at 113.
Moreover, as indicated in text, the compromise approach in
the marital deduction context is supported by the theory that
the estate receives the benefit of the income tax deduction
that would have been available to the spouse.
30
See note 8 supra.
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